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Abstract 
What are the effects of strengthening patent protection on income and consumption inequality? 
To analyze this question, this paper incorporates heterogeneity in the initial wealth of households into a 
canonical quality-ladder growth model with endogenous labor supply. In this model, I firstly show that 
the aggregate economy always jumps immediately to a unique and stable balanced-growth path. Given 
the balanced-growth behavior of the aggregate economy and an exogenous distribution of initial wealth, I 
then show that the endogenous distribution of assets in subsequent periods is stationary and equal to its 
initial distribution. The model predicts that strengthening patent protection increases (a) economic growth 
by stimulating R&D investment and (b) income inequality by raising the return on assets. However, 
whether it also increases consumption inequality depends on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. If 
and only if this elasticity is less (greater) than unity, strengthening patent protection increases (decreases) 
consumption inequality. For standard parameter values, strengthening patent protection leads to a larger 
increase in income inequality than consumption inequality.  
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1. Introduction 
What are the effects of strengthening patent protection on income and consumption inequality? To 
analyze this question, this paper incorporates heterogeneity in the initial wealth of households into a 
canonical quality-ladder growth model with endogenous labor supply. In this model, I firstly show that 
the aggregate economy always jumps immediately to a unique and stable balanced-growth path. Given 
the balanced-growth behavior of the aggregate economy and an exogenous distribution of initial wealth, I 
then show that the endogenous distribution of assets in subsequent periods is stationary and equal to its 
initial distribution. The model predicts that strengthening patent protection increases (a) economic growth 
by stimulating R&D investment and (b) income inequality by raising the return on assets. However, 
whether it also increases consumption inequality depends on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. If 
and only if this elasticity is less (greater) than unity, strengthening patent protection increases (decreases) 
consumption inequality. For standard parameter values, strengthening patent protection leads to a larger 
increase in income inequality than consumption inequality.   
 These theoretical and numerical predictions are consistent with the following stylized facts. 
Firstly, the level of patent protection in the U.S. is widely believed to have increased since the 80’s.1 
Secondly, industrial R&D spending has been increasing since 1980 (see Figure 1). Thirdly, there is well-
documented evidence that income inequality has increased significantly over the same period. 
Interestingly, Krueger and Perri (2006) provide careful empirical evidence based on the Consumer 
Expenditure Survey from 1980 to 2003 to show that the sharp increase in income inequality was 
accompanied by a much smaller increase in consumption inequality. Therefore, the findings of the current 
paper suggest that patent policy may be able to provide a partial explanation on the trends of income and 
consumption inequality in the U.S. over the past decades.  
 The effect of patent policy on income inequality can be easily demonstrated as follows. Denote 
the real income of household h at time t as )(hyt  that equals the sum of a real wage income tw  from 
                                                 
1 See Jaffe (2000), Gallini (2002) and Jaffe and Lerner (2004) for a comprehensive discussion.  
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inelastic labor supply2 and a return from financial assets )(hvr tt , in which tr  is the real rate of return on 
asset )(hvt . Denote the share of total assets owned by household h as tttv vhvhs /)()(, ≡ , in which tv  is 
the total and average real value of financial assets in the economy at time t. Suppose the distribution of 
)(, hs tv  is stationary and equals to its initial distribution that has a mean of 1 and a standard deviation of 
vσ . Let )/()]([/)()(, ttttttttty vrwhvrwyhyhs ++=≡  denote the share of income earned by household 
h. The first-order condition from the R&D sector is given by ϕtt vw =  that equates the marginal cost of 
hiring an R&D worker (i.e. the wage rate) to the marginal benefit given by the worker’s probability ϕ  in 
obtaining a successful invention that has a value of tv . In a canonical quality-ladder model, the market 
value of inventions equals the total value of assets, and there is a unit-continuum of valuable inventions. 
The share of income earned by household h becomes )/()]([)( ,, ttvtty rhsrhs ++= ϕϕ , which implies that 
the standard deviation of )(, hs ty  in the steady state is given by )/(. rrvy += ϕσσ . Because the steady-
state return r  on assets is an increasing function in the equilibrium growth rate, strengthening patent 
protection increases R&D investment as well as economic growth and hence worsens income inequality. 
 
Related Literature 
This paper relates to a number of literatures (a) income inequality and economic growth, (b) endogenous-
growth theory and (c) patent policy. The study of inequality and growth has an established and vast 
literature. 3  Garcia-Penalosa and Turnovsky (2006) incorporate heterogeneity in initial wealth into a 
canonical AK endogenous-growth model and develop an elegant approach to show that the endogenous 
distribution of assets is stationary. The current study adopts a similar approach to show that the 
endogenous distribution of assets is also stationary in a canonical quality-ladder model as in Aghion and 
Howitt (1992) and Grossman and Helpman (1991). One interesting difference between the two models is 
                                                 
2 The model features elastic labor supply to show that this result is robust to labor-supply decisions. 
3 See Aghion et al. (1999) for a recent survey.  
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that Garcia-Penalosa and Turnovsky’s (2006) AK model relies on endogenous labor supply to generate an 
endogenous income distribution while the quality-ladder model does not. 
Upon developing the basic framework, the current study analyzes the effects of patent policy on 
inequality and growth. This analysis has important policy implications on the problem of R&D 
underinvestment in the market economy suggested by Jones and Williams (1998, 2000). Given R&D 
underinvestment, patent policy is an important instrument that can be used to correct for this market 
failure and increase economic growth. Li (2001) and O’Donoghue and Zweimuller (2004) analyze the 
effects of patent policy in quality-ladder models that have a representative household. The current paper 
contributes to this literature by providing a framework that can be applied to investigate the effects of 
patent policy on income and consumption inequality in addition to growth.  
 Chou and Talmain (1996), Li (1998), Zweimuller (2000) and Foellmi and Zweimuller (2006) also 
consider wealth distribution in R&D-growth models, and they focus on the effects of wealth inequality on 
growth through different channels, such as the concavity/convexity of the labor Engel curve in Chou and 
Talmain (1996), indivisible consumption of quality goods in Li (1998), hierarchical preferences in 
Zweimuller (2000) and Foellmi and Zweimuller (2006). The current paper differs from these studies by 
considering how policy changes affect income and consumption inequality given a certain degree of 
wealth inequality. Hatipoglu (2008) incorporates finite patent length into Foellmi and Zweimuller’s 
(2006) model to analyze the effects of wealth inequality on growth at different length of patent. In 
contrast, the current study focuses on patent breadth (i.e. patent protection against imitation) and shows 
that it may have different qualitative and quantitative effects on income and consumption inequality. As 
for differences in the policy instruments, patent breadth (length) mainly affects current (future) profits.  
 
2. The Model 
I develop a quality-ladder model similar to Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Grossman and Helpman (1991) 
by adding mainly three features (a) heterogeneity in initial wealth, (b) incomplete patent breadth and (c) 
endogenous labor supply. Given that quality-ladder models have been well-studied, the model’s 
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components are briefly described in Sections 2.1 – 2.3. Section 2.4 defines the decentralized equilibrium 
and shows that the aggregate economy is always on a unique and stable balanced-growth path. Given the 
balanced-growth behavior of the aggregate economy and an exogenous distribution of initial wealth, 
Section 2.5 shows that the endogenous distribution of assets in subsequent periods is stationary. Section 
2.6 analyzes the effects of increasing patent breadth on income and consumption inequality. Section 2.7 
calibrates the model and numerically evaluates the effects of patent on income/consumption inequality. 
 
 2.1. Households  
There is a continuum of identical households (except for the initial distribution of wealth) indexed by 
]1,0[∈h . Each household h has a standard iso-elastic utility function given by  
(1) ∫∞ −− ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−=
0
1
1
1)]()([)( . dthlhCehU ttt γ
γφ
ρ . 
),0( ∞∈γ  is the inverse of the intertemporal substitution elasticity γε /1≡ . 1== εγ  corresponds to 
the case of log utility. )(hCt  is the consumption of final goods. Each household is endowed with one unit 
of time to allocate between leisure )(hlt  and work )(hLt . 0≥φ  is a preference parameter on leisure, and 
setting φ  to zero corresponds to the case of inelastic labor supply. ρ  is the exogenous discount rate. To 
ensure that lifetime utility is bounded,   
(a1) g)1( γρ −> , 
where g  denotes the balanced-growth rate of consumption.  
Each household maximizes utility subject to a sequence of budget constraints given by  
(2) )()()()( hCPhLWhVRhV ttttttt −+=& . 
)(hVt  is the nominal value of financial assets owned by household h at time t. It is assumed that 
household h’s share of financial assets at time 0 is exogenously given by 000, /)()( VhVhsv ≡  that has a 
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general distribution function with a mean of ∫ =1
0
0, 1)( dhhsv  and a standard deviation of vσ . tR  is the 
nominal rate of return on financial assets. Household h endogenously supplies )(hLt  to earn the nominal 
wage rate tW , which is normalized to one. tP  is the price of final goods. From the household’s 
intratemporal optimization, household h’s labor supply is determined by 
(3) )()()(1 . hCPhlhL tttt φ==− , 
where 1=tW . From the household’s intertemporal optimization, the familiar Euler equation is given by  
(4) 
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&&&
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⎛ −−= γ
γφργ . 
Lemma 1 shows that the consumption growth rate is the same across households. 
 
Lemma 1: Aggregate consumption and the consumption for household h evolve according to  
(5) 
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for all h. Also, aggregate labor supply is determined by ttt CPL .1 φ−= .   
Proof: Differentiate (3) with time and substitute it into (4). As for tL , integrate (3) with h.■  
 
To ensure that the Euler equation has the usual properties, the following parameter condition is assumed.  
(a2) 0)1( >−− γφγ . 
Final goods are produced by a standard Cobb-Douglas aggregator over a continuum of 
differentiated intermediates goods ]1,0[∈i  given by  
(6) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= ∫1
0
)(lnexp diiXC tt . 
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I define a new variable ttt CPE ≡  to denote the aggregate nominal expenditure that will be convenient for 
analyzing the stability of the balanced-growth path. Introducing the price variables in nominal value is 
also for this purpose.  
 
 2.2. Intermediate Goods 
There is a continuum of industries indexed by ]1,0[∈i  producing the differentiated intermediate goods. 
Each industry i is dominated by a temporary monopolistic leader who holds the patent for the latest 
technology in the industry. The production function for the leader in industry i is  
(7) )()( ,
)( iLziX tx
in
t
t= . 
)(, iL tx  is the number of workers in industry i. 1>z  is the exogenous productivity improvement from 
each invention, and )(int  is the number of inventions that has occurred as of time t. Given 
)(intz , 
(8) )()( /1/)( inintt tt zzWiMC ==  
is the nominal marginal cost of production for the leader in industry i.  
As commonly assumed in the literature, the current and former industry leaders engage in 
Bertrand competition, and the optimal pricing strategy for the current industry leader is a constant markup 
over the marginal cost given by  
(9) )(),()( iMCbziP tt μ= , 
where bzbz =),(μ  for ]1,0(∈b  that captures the level of patent breadth. In Aghion and Howitt (1992) 
and Grossman and Helpman (1991), there is complete patent protection against imitation such that 1=b . 
Li (2001) generalizes the policy environment to capture incomplete patent protection against imitation 
such that )1,0(∈b .4 Because of incomplete patent protection, the former industry leader’s productivity 
                                                 
4 O’Donoghue and Zweimuller (2004) refer to this form of patent protection as lagging breadth, and they formalize 
another form of patent protection known as leading breadth (i.e. patent protection against subsequent innovations). 
For the purpose of the current study, the consideration of lagging patent breadth is sufficient.   
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increases by a factor of bz −1  such that her productivity becomes bininb tt zzz −−− = )(1)(1 . Therefore, the 
limiting-pricing markup for the current industry leader is given by bz . 
 An increase in the level of patent breadth b  enables an industry leader to charge a higher 
markup. The resulting increases in the amount of monopolistic profit and the value of an invention 
improve the incentives for R&D investment that potentially increase economic growth. 
  
 2.3. R&D 
Denote the expected nominal value of an invention for industry i as )(iVt . Because of the Cobb-Douglas 
specification in (6), the amount of monopolistic profit is the same across industries (i.e. tt i ππ =)(  for 
]1,0[∈i ). As a result, tt ViV =)(  for ]1,0[∈i . Because patents are the only assets in the economy, tV  
equals the total value of assets owned by households. The familiar no-arbitrage condition for tV  is  
(10) tttttt VVVR λπ −+= & . 
The left-hand side of (10) is the nominal return from this asset.5 The right-hand side of (10) is the sum of 
(a) the monopolistic profit tπ  generated by this asset, (b) the potential capital gain, and (c) the expected 
capital loss due to creative destruction, in which tλ  is the Poisson arrival rate of the next invention.  
 There is a continuum of R&D entrepreneurs indexed by ]1,0[∈j , and they hire workers to create 
inventions. The expected profit for entrepreneur j is 
(11) )()()( ,, jLWjVj trttttr −= λπ . 
The Poisson arrival rate of an invention for entrepreneur j is )()( ,. jLj trt ϕλ = , where ϕ  captures the 
productivity of R&D workers. The first-order condition from the R&D sector is given by  
(12) 1== tt WVϕ . 
This condition determines the allocation of labor between production and R&D.  
                                                 
5 As in Grossman and Helpman (1991), the risky asset is valued at the risk-free rate because the idiosyncratic risk 
for any one leader is fully diversified assuming the existence of a well-functioning stock market.  
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 2.4. Decentralized Equilibrium 
The equilibrium is a sequence of prices ∞=0)}(,),(,,,{ ttttttt hVViPPWR  and a sequence of allocations 
∞
=0,, )}(),(),(),(),({ ttttrtxt hChLjLiLiX  such that in each period,  
a. household ]1,0[∈h  chooses )}(),({ hLhC tt  to maximize (1) subject to (2) taking },,{ ttt PWR  as 
given;  
b. the monopolistic leader in industry ]1,0[∈i  chooses )}(),({ , iLiP txt  to maximize profit according 
to the Bertrand competition and taking }{ tW  as given; 
c. R&D entrepreneur ]1,0[∈j  chooses )}({ , jL tr  to maximize profit taking },{ tt VW  as given;  
d. the market for final goods clears such that ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛== ∫∫ 1
0
1
0
)(lnexp)( diiXCdhhC ttt ; 
e. the labor market clears such that ∫∫∫ +==
1
0
,
1
0
,
1
0
)()()( djjLdiiLLdhhL trtxtt .  
The next step is to show that the aggregate economy is always on a unique and stable balanced-
growth path. This result can be proven by analyzing the labor-market condition and the law of motion for 
the aggregate expenditure in a phase diagram of },{ ttE λ  to show that the economy always jumps 
immediately to the intersection of the 0=tE&  locus and ttrtx LLL =+ ,, .6 This exercise is similar to the 
one in Grossman and Helpman (1991) except with endogenous labor supply and hence is relegated to 
Appendix A. Another difference is that 1=γ  in Grossman and Helpman (1991). When ),0( ∞∈γ , a 
sufficient condition for the saddle-point stability is  
(a3) )1,(ln/11 −∞∈≡−> γγ z . 
 
                                                 
6 As in Grossman and Helpman (1991), an implicit assumption behind this result is that at any point in time, each 
industry has an existing leader with a competitor one step down the quality ladder. 
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Lemma 2: The aggregate economy is always on a unique and stable balanced-growth path, in which tC  
grows at rate g , tP  decreases at rate g , and both tL  and tV  are constant.  
Proof: See Appendix A.■  
 
Lemma 3: The balanced-growth equilibrium is characterized by  
(13) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
++−+
++−−=
− )()1(ln)1)]((1[
/1ln)1()(1)(*
bzb
zbbL μφγφμ
ϕργφμ , 
(14) 
)(
)(1)(
*
*
b
bLbLx φμ
−=
−
, 
(15) )()](1[1)( ** bLbbL xr φμ+−=+ , 
(16) zbLbg r ln)()(
**
.ϕ=
+
, 
(17) )(/)( ***** . bgPPRbr γρ +=−≡
+
& , 
(18) )1/(])[()( ********** φ++−=+−= ttttt wvgrLwvgrC . 
Proof: See Appendix A.■  
 
*r  is the steady-state real interest rate. ttt PWw /≡  denotes the real wage rate that increases at rate g. 
ttt PVv /≡  denotes the real value of assets that also increases at rate g. Note that ** )1( tt wC >+φ  because 
0)1( *** >−+=− ggr γρ  from (a1). Ensuring 0* >rL  requires a lower bound on R&D productivity  
(a4) )1/()1( −+> μφμρϕ . 
 
 2.5. Distribution of Assets 
I adopt a similar approach as in Garcia-Penalosa and Turnovsky (2006) to show that the distribution of 
assets is stationary. To do this, it is more convenient to rewrite (2) in terms of real variables such that  
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(19) )()()()( hChLwhvrhv tttttt −+=& . 
The aggregate and average real value of assets evolves according to  
(20) tttttt CLwvrv −+=& . 
Combining (19) and (20), the law of motion for tttv vhvhs /)()(, ≡  is given by  
(21) 
t
ttt
t
ttt
tv
tv
v
CLw
hv
hChLw
hs
hs −−−=
)(
)()(
)(
)(
,
,& . 
Using )()](1[ . hChLw ttt φ=− , the equilibrium value of )(*, hs tv  evolves according to a simple linear 
differential equation given by  
(22) *
***
*
,*
**
*
,
)1()()()1()(
t
ttc
tv
t
tt
tv v
wChshs
v
wChs −+−−+= φφ& . 
(22) describes the potential evolution of )(*, hs tv  given an initial value of )(0, hsv . 
*** /)()( ttc ChChs ≡  is a 
stationary variable because of Lemma 1. Because *tC , 
*
tw  and 
*
tv  all increase at rate g, the coefficient of 
)(*, hs tv  and the last term in (22) are constant. Also, the coefficient of )(
*
, hs tv  is positive because 
** )1( tt wC >+φ   from (18). Therefore, the only solution consistent with long-run stability is 0)(*, =hs tv&  
for all t. From (22), 0)(*, =hs tv&  for all t implies that )()( 0,*, hshs vtv =  and  
(23) φφ
φ
+
+−=+
+−+=
1
)()(
1
)(])1([
)(
*****
0,
**
* tttvtt
t
whvgrwhswChC  
for all t. Proposition 1 summarizes the stationarity of the wealth distribution.  
 
Proposition 1: For every household, )()( 0,
*
, hshs vtv =  for all t.   
Proof: Proven in the text.■  
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 2.6. Income and Consumption Inequality 
Given the previous results that the economy is always on a unique and stable balanced-growth path and 
the endogenous distribution of assets equals its initial distribution, this section analyzes the effects of 
increasing patent breadth b  on income and consumption inequality. In equilibrium, the real value of 
income for household h is  
(24) )()()()()( ********* . hCwhvrhLwhvrhy tttttt φ−+=+= . 
From (12), (23) and Proposition 1, the share of income earned by household h simplifies to  
(25) ϕφ
ϕφ
++
++=≡ ** 0,
**
*
*
*
,
.
. )()()()(
gr
hsgr
y
hyhs v
t
t
ty  
for all t. (25) implies that the equilibrium standard deviation of real income ∫ −≡ 1
0
2*
,
* ]1)([ dhhs tyyσ  is  
(26) vy gr
gr σϕφ
φσ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
++
+= **
**
*
.
.
. 
Following Garcia-Penalosa and Turnovsky (2006) to use the standard deviation of relative income as a 
measure of income inequality, Proposition 2 summarizes the effect of patent policy on income inequality.   
 
Proposition 2: An increase in the level of patent breadth increases income inequality.  
Proof: An increase in b  raises *r  and *g , and the resulting increases in *r  and *g  raise *yσ .■ 
 
Intuitively, the increase in patent protection raises R&D spending and hence the equilibrium growth rate. 
This higher growth rate drives up the real interest rate, and the resulting higher return on assets increases 
the relative income of households who have a larger fraction of income coming from assets. Note that 
increasing patent breadth raises income inequality even in the case of inelastic labor supply (i.e. 0=φ ). 
 The consumption of final goods for household h is given by (23). From (12), (18) and Proposition 
1, the share of consumption by household h is  
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(27) ϕ
ϕ
+−
+−=≡ ** 0,
**
*
*
*
,
)()()()(
gr
hsgr
C
hChs v
t
t
tc  
for all t. (27) implies that the equilibrium standard deviation of consumption ∫ −≡ 1
0
2*
,
* ]1)([ dhhs tccσ  is  
(28) vc gr
gr σϕσ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+−
−= **
**
* . 
Proposition 3 summarizes the effect of patent policy on consumption inequality.   
 
Proposition 3: An increase in the level of patent breadth increases (decreases) consumption inequality if 
and only if the elasticity of intertemporal substitution ε  is less (greater) than unity.  
Proof: An increase in b  raises *r  and *g . (17) shows that the resulting increases in *r  and *g  lead to a 
higher (lower) *cσ  if and only if εγ /1=  is greater (less) than one.■ 
 
Intuitively, strengthening patent protection increases economic growth, and this higher growth rate 
increases the fraction of assets ** tvg  that needs to be saved. At the same time, the higher growth rate also 
raises the return on assets ** tvr . Whether the increase in return is sufficient to compensate for the increase 
in saving in order for the fraction of assets consumed to increase depends on the value of γε /1= . For a 
low (high) value of γε /1= , the increase in *r  is large (small) enough for the fraction of assets 
consumed to increase (decrease). The larger (smaller) fraction of assets consumed increases (decreases) 
the relative consumption of households who finance a larger fraction of consumption by asset income. For 
the benchmark case of log utility, the two effects offset each other leaving the fraction of assets consumed 
and hence relative consumption as well as consumption inequality unchanged.  
 Finally, Proposition 4 shows that income inequality is always larger than consumption inequality, 
and this finding is consistent with the empirical evidence provided by Krueger and Perri (2006).  
 - 13 -
Proposition 4: ** cy σσ > . 
Proof: Compare (26) and (28).■ 
 
2.7. Numerical Analysis 
For illustrative purposes, this section calibrates the model and numerically evaluates the effects of patent 
on income and consumption inequality. From the model, I express each of the following moments as a 
function of structural parameters and then use the values of these moments in the data to infer the 
parameter values. I use standard values for the fraction of time devoted to leisure 7.0=l , the real rate of 
return on assets 07.0=r , and total factor productivity growth 01.0=g . For the arrival rate of 
inventions, I set λ  to 0.33 such that the average time between arrivals of inventions is 3 years as in 
Acemoglu and Akcigit (2008).7 R&D spending as a share of GDP is given by )/( wLwLr +π  in the 
model. Assuming that the increase in R&D spending since the 80’s has been driven by patent protection, 
the hypothetical exercise is to firstly use the time trend of R&D share from 1980 to 2004 to infer a time 
path for patent breadth b  and then examine how the increase in b  affects the relative level of income and 
consumption inequality. Figure 1 plots the time path of R&D share and its trend. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
Given a value for γ , the five moment conditions determine respectively the values of },,,,{ bz ϕρφ . As 
for γ , I use a conservative value of 3 implying an intertemporal substitution elasticity of 0.33 that is 
within the usual range in the business-cycle literature.8 In summary, the calibrated parameter values are 
}62.0,4.71,03.1,04.0,33.2,3{ 1980 ====== bz ϕρφγ . The values of the usual parameters seem 
reasonable, and the large value of ϕ  implies that asset income from patents ** tvr  is very small compared 
                                                 
7 Lanjouw (1998) estimates the obsolescence probability of patents in some industries, and the average estimated 
value is about 10%. Caballero and Jaffe (2002) estimate the rate of creative destruction to be about 4%. I have also 
considered these smaller values for }10.0,04.0{∈λ , and the result that strengthening patent protection has a larger 
effect on income inequality than on consumption inequality remains robust.  
8 At a lower value of γ  (i.e. a larger ε ), strengthening patent protection would increase income inequality relative 
to consumption inequality by even more.  
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to labor income **Lwt , where 
**
. tt vw ϕ=  from (12). This implication also seems reasonable given that 
labor income and industrial R&D spending are on average about 70% and less than 2% of GDP 
respectively.  
 The calibrated value of b  gradually increases from 0.62 in 1980 to 0.89 in 2004 implying a 
substantial increase in the level of patent protection. As a result of the increase in b , the model predicts 
that the relative standard deviation between income and consumption (i.e. ** / cy σσ ) would increase from 
1.55 to 1.71. This illustrative exercise suggests that for a given degree of wealth inequality, strengthening 
patent protection leads to a larger increase in income inequality than consumption inequality such that 
** / cy σσ  increases over time. 
   
3. Conclusion 
This paper analyzes the effects of patent policy on economic growth, income and consumption inequality. 
In summary, strengthening patent protection increases growth but worsens income inequality. However, 
the effect on consumption inequality is ambiguous and depends on the elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution. To derive these results, this paper incorporates heterogeneity in initial wealth into a 
canonical quality-ladder model. This class of first-generation endogenous-growth models exhibits scale 
effects,9 in which a larger economy experiences faster growth and an economy with growing population 
experiences an increasing growth rate rather than a balanced-growth path. The current paper avoids these 
problems by normalizing the population size to one. An interesting extension is to consider the effects of 
patent policy on growth and inequality in later vintages of R&D-growth models. Given that the canonical 
quality-ladder model does not feature some important macroeconomic elements, such as capital 
accumulation, business-cycle shocks and capital-market imperfection, an interesting exercise is to 
incorporate R&D-driven growth into a computational DSGE model with heterogeneous agents to examine 
the quantitative importance of patent policy on the distributions of wealth, income and consumption.  
                                                 
9 See, for example, Jones (1999) for a discussion on scale effects in R&D-growth models.  
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Appendix 
Proof for Lemma 2: For the stability and uniqueness of the balanced-growth path, I show that the labor-
market clearing condition and the law of motion for ttt CPE =  can be analyzed in a phase diagram with 
the same properties as in Grossman and Helpman (1991). The labor-market clearing condition is  
(A1) trtxt LLL ,, += . 
From aggregate labor supply, tt EL .1 φ−= . From the labor share of aggregate expenditure, μ/, ttx EL = . 
From the R&D production function, ϕλ /, ttrL = . Therefore, (A1) becomes 
(A2) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+= ϕ
λ
μφ
μ t
tE 11
. 
From (5), the law of motion for tE  is  
(A3) 
)1()1(
1
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E &&&&
. 
The price index is ttt ZdiiPP /)(lnexp
1
0
μ=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= ∫ , where ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛≡ ∫∫ ttt zdzdiinZ
0
1
0
lnexpln)(exp τλτ  
denotes aggregate technology. Therefore, zZZPP ttttt ln// λ−=−= && . As for tR , using the law of 
motion for tV  and the first-order condition from the R&D sector 1=ϕtV  yields  
(A4) ϕ
ϕλπλπ
/1
/tt
t
tttt
t V
VVR −=−+= & . 
Profit share is μμπ /)1( −= tt E . Then, substituting (A4) into (A3) yields 
(A5) 
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The 0=tE&  locus is given by  
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Figure 1 plots (A2) and (A6) in a phase diagram. 
 
The 0=tE&  locus is upward sloping from (a3). The coefficient of tE  in (A5) is positive from (a2). The 
coefficient of tλ  in (A5) is negative from (a2) and (a3). Therefore, the property of the dynamic system is 
the same as in Grossman and Helpman (1991), in which the economy jumps immediately to },{ ** Eλ .■  
 
Proof for Lemma 3: Equating (A2) and (A6) yields  
(A7) 
)1(ln)1)(1(
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μφρμϕλ ++−+
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From the R&D production function,  
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*
rL  is increasing in μ  because )1/()1( φμφμ ++  is increasing in μ . Combining aggregate labor supply 
ttt CPL .1 φ−= , the price index tt ZP /μ=  and the aggregate production function txtt LZC ,=  yields 
(A9) txttt LCPL ,... 11 μφφ −=−= . 
Substituting (A8) and (A9) into the labor-market clearing condition trtxt LLL ,, +=  yields  
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Differentiating the log of aggregate technology ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= ∫tt zdZ
0
lnexp τλτ  with respect to time yields  
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From the aggregate production txtt LZC ,= ,  
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From the price index tt ZP /μ= ,  
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Substituting (A12) and (A13) into the Euler equation in (5) yields 
(A14) ***** ./ gPPRr γρ +=−≡ & . 
Finally, from (20) and aggregate labor supply )1(. ttt LwC −=φ , 
(A15) *********** .)()( tttttt CwvgrLwvgrC φ−+−=+−=  
because *** / ttt PVv =  grows at rate *g .■ 
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Figure 1: Industrial R&D as a Share of Non-Farm Business-Sector Output in the U.S.
0.0140
0.0150
0.0160
0.0170
0.0180
0.0190
0.0200
0.0210
0.0220
0.0230
0.0240
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Time
Data
Trend
 
 
Data sources: (a) National Science Foundation: Division of Science Resources Statistics; and (b) Bureau of 
Economic Analysis: National Income and Product Accounts.  
Footnote: R&D is net of federal spending, and non-farm business-sector output is calculated as GDP net of 
government spending and farm-sector output. The trend from the data is extracted using a standard HP-filter with a 
smoothing parameter of 100 for the annual frequency.  
 
  
